confidence

A nuclear triad refers to the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three basic components: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The purpose of having a three-branched nuclear capability is to significantly reduce the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation's nuclear deterrence.^[1][2][3]

Other methods of nuclear attacks are nuclear torpedos and the use of hypersonic glide vehicles.

India completed its nuclear triad with the commissioning of INS Arihant in August 2016.^{[17][18][19][20][21][22]} INS Arihant is a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine armed with 12 K-15 missileswith a range of 750 km,^[23] which will later be upgraded K-4 missiles with an extended range of 3500 km.^[24][25][26] India maintains a no first use nuclear policy and has been developing a nuclear triad capability as a part of its credible minimum deterrence doctrine.^[27] India's nuclear-weapons program possesses surface-to-surface missiles such as the Agni III and Agni IV. In addition, the 5,000–8000 km range Agni-V ICBM was also successfully tested for third time on 31 January 2015^[28] and is expected to enter service by 2016.^[29] India has nuclear-capable fighter aircraft such as the Dassault Mirage 2000H, Dassault Rafale, Sukhoi Su-30 MKI, MIG-29 and SEPECAT Jaguar. Land and air strike capabilities are under the control of Strategic Forces Command which is a part of Nuclear Command Authority.

In future, Agni-V is expected to feature Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVs) with each missile being capable of carrying 2–10 separate nuclear warheads.^[41] Each warhead can be assigned to a different target, separated by hundreds of kilometres; alternatively, two or more warheads can be assigned to one target.^[40] MIRVs ensure a credible second strike capability even with few missiles.

Ballistic missile defence system

In theory, when two nuclear powers go to war, they are inviting "mutual assured destruction". If you hit, you'll also get hurt. To shield the territory from the terror of nukes, interceptor missiles are developed to counter the ballistic missiles carrying a nuclear payload. They neutralize the ballistic missiles en route to the destination, making the nuclear warhead ineffective. The ballistic missile defence system is a package of advanced military radars, a command and control centre and a different range of missiles. After constant efforts of nearly a decade, India became the fourth nation to possess this extremely distinct technology.

Given its lack of capacity in a full-fledged nuclear war, Pakistan will have try a lot harder before it can give its arch-rival sleepless nights. 

The development of India's Pradyumna and Ashwin interceptor missiles, supported by the constantly improving Swordfish Radar, are seen by Islamabad as "upsetting the strategic balance". Given 50% odds of neutralizing an incoming ballistic missile, it muddles Pakistan's wartime strategy or virtually makes half of its arsenal ineffective. Like the ballistic submarine, even this technology is out of reach for Pakistan, whose meagre coffers apportion a paltry defence budget of $7.6 billion (India's defence budget is $51 billion). 

In conclusion, Pakistan's committed approach to tie with India nuke-for-a-nuke may seem daunting on the surface. However, given its lack of capacity in a full-fledged nuclear war, Pakistan will have try a lot harder before it can give its arch-rival sleepless nights.

While there can be little expectation of any room for India in CPEC at present, there is space for India to step back and see where China and Pakistan want to go with it. The offer to India was made along with offers to other “neighbouring countries”. Already, Iran wants Gwadar to be a “sister” port to Chabahar, and Turkmenistan and other Central Asian republics have shown interest in the warm-water port that will be a nodal point for goods through Pakistan to the Chinese city of Kashgar. Further north, despite its problems on terror from Pakistan, Afghanistan is becoming a nodal point for China’s connectivity projects to Iran. The meeting among Russian, Chinese and Pakistani officials on Afghanistan this week, and Russian engagement with the Taliban, indicate much more is changing in the region than just the alignment of highways and tunnels. While India has done well to shore up relations with others in the region, it cannot afford to be blindsided by their involvement with the OBOR project and Chinese plans. CPEC is no longer a project in Pakistan, but one that runs through it, a project that will link 64 countries.